The diffusion of low-cost sensor network technologies in smart buildings has enabled the collection of massive amounts of data regarding indoor environments, energy use and occupants, which, in turn, creates opportunities for knowledge-and information-based building management. Driven by benefits mutual to occupants, building managers, and research communities, there is a demand for data publication to foster more sophisticated and robust models and algorithms. Data in the original form, however, contains sensitive information about occupants' behavioral patterns, and publishing such data will violate individuals' privacy. The current practice on publishing building-related datasets relies primarily on policies for dictating which types of data can be published and agreements on the use of published data. This approach alone provides insufficient protection as it does not prevent privacy breaches from occurring in the first place.
INTRODUCTION
The large-scale sensor networks deployed in smart buildings produce massive amounts of data, which is being used to inform datadriven decision making to achieve higher efficiency, better comfort and more security. Occupancy modeling and energy profiling are two good examples of building applications with a significant focus and reliance on data-driven analytics. Occupancy modeling derives occupancy schedules from data and allows for on-demand control over lighting and HVAC systems [20] . Similarly, energy profiling involves the characterization of users' energy use. Such characterization can be used to gain insights into how buildings are used, operated, and managed [16] .
Spurred on by benefits mutual to occupants, building managers and research communities, there is a continually rising demand for the publication of datasets collected in buildings. For research communities, large-scale and high-quality datasets are often enablers of more robust and sophisticated models. The convergence of big data and more advanced data analysis tools developed by researchers will eventually give rise to more resilient, occupant-responsive, and cost-effective building management.
However, data published in the original form comes with the risk of privacy loss, as it allows detailed inference about users' behaviors. Previous studies [11, 21] have shown that occupants' schedules and activities can be easily retrieved from occupancy and energy datasets. Tech-savvy criminals are already exploiting unintentional occupancy leaks to select victims for burglaries [4] . In addition, electricity data also indirectly reveals private information that is of interest to insurance companies, marketers, potential employers or the government for settings such as premium rates, directing ads, vetting an applicant's background or monitoring its citizens [23] .
Current practice in publishing building-related datasets mainly relies on policy and agreements to regulate data use, sharing, and retention [2] . However, this prescriptive approach does not prevent privacy breaches from happening in the first place. Prior to publication, privacy sensitive datasets are often anonymized by suppressing direct identifiers such as the identity of record owners. However, datasets resulting from applying simple suppression operations are vulnerable to adversaries with auxiliary knowledge. Given that an adversary possesses a few snippets of a user's data or prior knowledge of the user's pattern, the data record of such user can be easily re-identified from the anonymized database by matching the records with the auxiliary information. This prior knowledge often can be easily obtained via external observations or interaction with the targeted user.
Privacy-preserving data publication has been extensively studied in various contexts, including social networks [18] , smart meter data [28] , etc. Depending on the underlying definition of privacy, data publication procedures can be generally categorized into three types: (1) differentially private, (2) information-theoretically private, and (3) k-anonymous. Differential privacy [10] is one of the most popular metrics for privacy, which enjoys mathematical rigorousness and often acts as a worst-case privacy measure against any possible adversaries. It is typically assured by adding appropriately chosen random noise to the database output. Differential private systems have been successfully deployed to collect data on Chrome Web browser [12] . One known challenge for differentiallyprivate publication is that for high-dimensional streaming data it often adds too much noise, which may lead to unsatisfactory data utility. Hence it is not applicable for releasing building-related datasets which are typically in the form of time series. Informationtheoretically private publication guarantees that limited knowledge can be learned about individuals from public database, and the amount of information leakage is characterized via information theory [9, 19] . Pajagopalan et al. [27] adopts an information-theoretic approach to studying the publication of smart meter databases. This framework facilitates the analysis of privacy-utility tradeoff for data publication. However, the use of this framework requires a model of private behaviors, which is often difficult to be constructed in practice.
K-anonymous publication provides a "hide-in-the-crowd" type of privacy guarantee. It ensures that each record in a database is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records in the database. Since k-anonymity is conceptually simple and easily implementable, it has been extensively used in various public datasets especially for location data collected from mobile devices [15] . Some states in the U.S., such as California, Colorado and Illinois, have enacted a privacy standard, often referred to as "15/15" rule, for utilities in order to help ensure customer anonymity when energy data is released to third parties without customer consent [1] . The privacy standard is based on k-anonymity concept, requiring that aggregated data include a minimum of 15 customers with no one customer's load exceeding 15 percent of the group's energy consumption.
In this paper, we present PAD, a privacy-preserving data publication system that is able to release high-dimensional datasets with k-anonymity guarantee as well as low information loss. A unique feature of PAD that differentiates it from existing k-anonymous data publication systems is that if the purpose of a dataset is known prior to publication, PAD can incorporate the dataset users' inputs into the publication process and customize the published dataset to make it better serve the purpose of the data. PAD offers a unified protocol to comprehend possibly very diverse interests of data users and optimizes data publication in accordance with data purpose.
The contributions of the paper are as follows.
• Design and implement an open-sourced system to publish building-related datasets that guarantee k-anonymity.
• Employing metric learning techniques to learn the intended data use from interactions with the data analyst and then use it to reduce the information loss incurred by data privatization.
• Extensive experimental evaluation using real-world building data on occupancy presence and plug-load energy consumption to demonstrate the value of k-anonymized datasets.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of k-anonymity, its privacy implications and the basic technique for achieving k-anonymity. Section 3 presents the architecture of PAD and the individual algorithms used in the implementation of PAD. In Section 4, we present the evaluation of PAD based on real-world datasets. Section 5 discusses the limitation of PAD and future work. Section 6 includes the related work of our paper. Section 7 concludes the paper.
K-ANONYMITY
The concept of k-anonymity [29] was originally introduced in the context of relational data privacy. The idea behind k-anonymity can be described as "hiding in the crowd", as it requires that each individual cannot be identified within a set of k individuals in the released data.
In this paper, we deal with a slightly more general definition of k-anonymity, i.e., we consider a row in database as k-anonymous if and only if it is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other rows. Depending on the contents of a row, this definition can incorporate the privacy guarantee at different levels. For instance, if each row is a daily energy or occupancy profile of a person, then this definition ensures that the profile of each day cannot be differentiated from k − 1 other profiles. If we consider that each row in the database contains information of an individual person, then we recover userlevel privacy which guarantees the indistinguishability of k persons and therefore offers a stronger privacy notion.
In this section, we will discuss the privacy value of k-anonymity and attacker models, followed by a brief introduction of basic techniques for achieving k-anonymity. We will close the section by discussing the intrinsic tradeoff between privacy and data utility and some limitation of basic techniques to motivate the design of the proposed system.
Privacy Value
We illustrate the privacy value of the k-anonymity model by comparing it with the strategy that only masks the identifier of each row in a database. Assuming a data analyst requests data publishing and the database is sanitized solely by suppressing names of the data owners, we want to show that the information retained in this database can still create a threat against data privacy, especially when combined with external observations or knowledge.
As an example, consider the scenario depicted in Figure 1 where the database contains four rows corresponding to the office occupancy status of four persons labeled as A, B, C, and D. If no k-anonymization is performed by the data curator, then the following linkage attack can be performed: Suppose the adversary knows that C stays in this office at 20:00, then by linking this information with the data trajectories it has at hand it can find the complete occupancy status of C in the time horizon of the published data. However, such linkage attack is not effective if proper data perturbation is performed by the data curator to maintain k-anonymity. Consider the 2-anonymized version of the original dataset illustrated by Figure 1b . Now, even if the adversary can have access to the knowledge of occupancy status of C via external observations, it cannot recover the complete data trajectories with certainty as 2-anonymity guarantees that at least 2 rows in the database have exactly the same values. In this paper, we wish to achieve data protection against the adversaries with the following capabilities: (1) Having access to the published data; (2) Knowing short snippets of truthful private data by external observations.
Microaggregation
Microaggregation is a popular perturbation technique to achieve k-anonymity for databases with quantitative records. It processes the data in the following two steps prior to publication:
Step 1 (k-partition): All rows in the database are partitioned into small aggregates of k or more rows.
Step 2 (substitution): Each individual row is replaced with the centroid of the group it belongs to.
Following this procedure ensures that every record in the released database corresponds to at least k individual records; hence, k-anonymity is guaranteed.
Due to the data distortion introduced in the substitution step, the main problem in microaggregation is to retain as much information as possible while offering sufficient privacy protection. In order to minimize the information loss caused by microaggregation, groups should be formed by maximizing their within-group homogeneity. The more homogeneous the records in a group are, the lower information loss is incurred when replacing the true value of a record by the group average. The sum of squared distances (SSD) criterion is a common measure to estimate group heterogeneity and this is defined as
where x i j denotes the j-th row of i-th group,x i represents the centroid of the group i, n i is the number of elements in i-th group and д stands for the number of groups. The distance metric d(·, ·) in equation (1) is often chosen to be an uninformed norm, such as Euclidean distance. Although Euclidean distance is simple and intuitive, it ignores the fact that the semantic meaning of "information loss" is inherently task-and datadependent [30] . To illustrate this point, imagine two researchers who want to analyze the same occupancy dataset. The first one is interested in the occupancy patterns during electricity peak demand hours in order to estimate the demand response potential, whereas the second one is interested in the aggregate occupancy over the day for energy modeling purposes. Given the nature of their respective tasks, both should use very different distance metrics to measure the information loss. If the purpose of the data is known at the time of publication, it can be taken into account during microaggregation to better retain information. But clearly, building a system to parse data users' interest is not the most robust and scalable approach due to the diversity of different data analysts' interest. It is, therefore, more desirable to have a standard protocol for different users to express their respective data purposes. Our approach implemented in PAD is to learn the distance metric explicitly for each specific application from data points' similarity labeled by the user.
PAD: DESIGN AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we first give an overview of PAD and then provide an in-depth description of the algorithms implemented in each module of the system. We assume that the data publisher collects data records and releases the collected data to the data recipient, who will then conduct data mining on the published data. We will use "data recipient" and "data analyst" interchangeably in this paper. Further, we assume that the data publisher is trustworthy yet the data recipients are not. This assumption is also referred to as the trusted model [13] . Since in our framework data analysts can interact with the data publication system to improve the usefulness of the published data, it is important to ensure that data analysts do not have access to the original database during any part of the data publication process. Figure 2 illustrates the design of PAD. The objective of the system is to publish the dataset with k-anonymity guarantee as well as high quality in support of the required data analysis. The core idea of the system is to improve the data fidelity by learning how the data is intended to be used and then proactively adjusting the data perturbation algorithm accordingly. The data is firstly pre-sanitized and formed into pairs; (2) The data pairs are subsampled and returned to the data analyst to solicit their labels on which data pairs are considered to be similar (The labels can be assigned manually or automatically using custom programs); (3) PAD learns a metric from the similarity labels; (4) The learned metric is used by microaggregation to generate the sanitized dataset for final publication.
System Overview
If the data is not used for specialized purposes, then PAD directly applies microaggregation and publishes the database. Otherwise, the PAD system processes the original database in the following four steps.
(1) Pre-sanitization. The objective of this step is to provide a k-anonymized dataset for the data analyst to label the similarity of data points. The similarity labels will be used to learn the purpose of the data analysis in subsequent steps. At this step the system has not received any inputs from the data analyst yet. We will therefore use microaggregation with a simple generic distance metric, e.g., Euclidean distance, to pre-sanitize the data.
(2) Subsampling. As the second step, PAD processes the rows in the pre-sanitized database into pairs and randomly selects some pairs to be returned to the data analyst, who will then assign a binary label indicating if the two rows are similar or not in accordance with the particular data purpose to each returned data pair. Consider, for example, the two pairs of occupancy records depicted in Figure 3 . If the data analyst wants the published dataset to maximally retain the information regarding the occupancy patterns during lunch time, then he will assign "dissimilar" to the first pair and "similar" to the second one; however, if the data analyst is interested in the occupancy patterns during the entire day, then the first pair will be labeled as "similar" and the second one as "dissimilar". In the case where the desired metric for comparing similarity can be explicitly defined, labeling effort can be greatly alleviated by using computer programs to automatically label similarity of data points based on the desired metric.
(3) Metric learning. In this step, a distance metric over the data record is automatically learned from the data pairs and the similarity relationships indicated by the data analyst.
(4) Microaggregation. This step uses the distance metric learned from the previous step for microaggregation so that the database can be sanitized in a way that the information of interest to the data analyst is maximally retained.
We want to point out that the existence, amount and quality of similarity labels provided by the data analyst affect the usefulness of the published data; however, the privacy level remains the same regardless because the dataset is always microaggregated before publication.
Distance Metric Learning
We will first discuss the algorithm implemented in the distance metric learning step. Let the original, pre-sanitized, and finally published dataset be denoted by X ,X , andX , respectively. In the metric learning step, the data analyst is provided with some data pairs (x k ,x j ) (k, j = 1, · · · , |X |) from the pre-sanitized database, and assigns a similarity label to each of the data pairs. Our objective is to learn a distance metric d(x, y) between points x and y so that "similar" points end up close to each other.
The idea underlying our metric learning is to parameterize the distance metric and find the parameters that best explain the similarity relationships labeled by the data analyst. To be specific, we consider the distance function of the following form
where A is a semi-definite matrix to ensure d(x, y) to be a welldefined metric that satisfies non-negativity and the triangle inequality. This distance metric, also termed Mahalanobis distance, is a generalization of Euclidean distance by admitting linear scalings and rotations of the original data space. A is often termed as inverse covariance (IC) matrix. Setting A to be the identity matrix I gives the Euclidean distance; Restricting A to be diagonal corresponds to learning a metric where the different axes are weighted differ-
2 y 2 , and therefore learning a full matrix A is equivalent to finding a scaling and rotation of data that replaces each point x with A 1 2 x and applying the Euclidean distance to the tranformed data.
Suppose each row record has length m, i.e., x ∈ R m , and the number of parameters to be estimated in total is m 2 . Building-related datasets are often in the form of time series, so m is large. However, we would like to require as minimal a labeling effort as possible to facilitate the use of PAD. Consequently, the main technical challenge is to learn a distance metric in the "high-dimensional" regime where the number of parameters to be determined is larger than the number of labeled samples.
Various distance metric learning techniques [30, 31] have been proposed in the literature, the core idea behind which is to form an optimization objective that minimizes the distance between the data pairs labeled as "similar" and pushes the "dissimilar" pairs far away.
As for metric learning in the high-dimensional regime, a typical technique used is to pose some restrictions or prior knowledge information on the distance metric model to regularize the model complexity. Consequently, only a smaller number of examples are required to learn a well posed metric [5, 26] .
Our approach adopts a similar idea and restricts the complexity of distance metric by imposing l 1 penalty. We propose the following l 1 -regularized optimization to find the Mahalanobis distance from the data pairs with similarity labels:
subject to
A 0
where S and D are the sets of data pairs that are labeled as "similar" and "dissimilar" respectively. The above optimization demands similar points to have small squared distances between them while dissimilar points be separated by a margin c. The choice of the constant c is arbitrary but not important, and changing it to any other positive constant b results only in A being replaced by (b/c) 2 A. Herein, we set c = 1 for simplicity. The high-dimensional nature of the distance metric over time series data and the relative scarcity of the labeled samples results in that the optimization problem without l 1 regularization is often underdetermined. The l 1 norm penalty ensures the solution to be sparse and capable of being generalized to unseen data pairs.
Efficient Algorithm for Microaggregation
As discussed previously, microaggregation includes two steps, namely, k-partition that clusters the data into group sizes of at least k records and a substitution step that perturbs the data by replacing the true values by the group centroid. It is possible that the data type of group centroid values are not consistent with the original data. For instance, the centroid of multiple occupancy time series is not necessary to be in an integer form. In such cases, proper post-processing, like rounding, should be conducted to make the published database meaningful. The information loss in the published dataset is mainly determined by the k-partition step. An optimal k-partition is defined to be the one that minimizes the heterogeneity of group members characterized by equation (1) . Note that k-partition is different from the classical clustering problem where the goal is to split the dataset into a fixed number of groups irrespective of the group size. In the case of k-partition, the constraints is on the group size instead of the number of groups. Nevertheless, we can modify the classical agglomerative clustering to make it serve for the k-partition purposes by terminating the agglomeration process at the proper level where the size of each group formed satisfies the constraints desired by the optimal k-partition.
The following proposition states the properties of the sizes of groups formed by optimal k-partition.
Proposition 1. An optimal solution to the k-partition problem of a set of data exists such that its groups have size greater than or equal to k and less than 2k.
The proof can be found in [7] . Proposition 1 indicates that the search space of the optimal k-partition can be reduced to the partition where all groups have size between k and 2k. We therefore modify a widely used agglomerative clustering algorithm, Ward's method [8] , to provide a heuristic and efficient solution that fulfills the group size requirements. The detailed algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 k-ward algorithm
Input: Database X i , i = 1, · · · , n 1: Group initialization 2: Define the extreme data points as the two which are most distant 3: For each of the extreme data points, take k − 1 data closest to it and form the first two groups 4: The rest of data points in the dataset constitute single-element groups 5: Agglomerative clustering via Ward's method 6: while there exists some group of the size less than k do 7: Find the nearest pair of distinct groups, at least one of which must have size less than k 8: Merge the two groups and decrement the number of groups by one 9: end while 10: if there exists some group containing 2k or more data then 11: Apply k-ward algorithm recursively on those groups 12: end if
EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of PAD using two datasets collected in real-world buildings. The questions we would like to answer from the experiments are: (1) How useful are the sanitized datasets for typical data mining purposes? (2) If the use purpose of a dataset is predetermined, can a dataset sanitized with the learned metric retain more relevant information than the one sanitized with an uninformed metric?
Datasets and Implementation
Our datasets include occupancy and plug-load power consumption, which represent typical building data types that may arouse occupants' privacy concerns. The occupancy dataset, lasting about half a year, was collected at a resolution of 1 minute in four classrooms of the OU44 building at the University of Southern Denmark. The occupancy time series is binary, indicating if the room is occupied/unoccupied. This dataset can potentially reveal privacy sensitive information such as daily routines and detailed schedules of the inhabitants. The plug load dataset consists of 15-minute-resolution power consumption data over 3 months. This dataset was collected at the individual desks of five occupants located in Cory Hall on UC Berkeley campus. Plug-load data also raises some privacy concerns. As shown in the previous studies [22, 24] , occupants' presence or even more detailed activities can be easily identified from the power data.
Since our dataset contains a relatively small population of individuals, we will consider anonymity protection at the daily profile level instead of the user level. In this regard, we process the dataset into the form where each row corresponds to a person's daily occupancy or energy profile. We would like to stress that PAD can also protect the anonymity at user level by feeding a dataset where each row corresponds to the data of a different user. The code of PAD is open-sourced at https://github.com/ruoxijia.
Utility of PAD with Generic Distance Metric
We first focus on a general scenario where the system does have access to similarity labels. Therefore, a generic metric, i.e., Euclidean distance, is used to perform micro-aggregation operation on the datasets to achieve k-anonymity. We utilize two typical data mining tasks, namely, occupancy prediction and statistical pattern detection, to test the usefulness of the dataset after sanitization.
Prediction. K-nearest neighbor (KNN)
based occupancy prediction models are built using the original and sanitized database respectively with varying anonymity levels. To make prediction at time t, we compute the distance between the testing profile and all profiles in the training set during the interval [t − Δt, t − 1] where Δt is the length of the window used for prediction, and then pick the most common occupancy value at t among the K nearest training profiles. Cross validation is performed to compute the average prediction accuracy across all time steps in the day. The results are shown in Figure 4a , where the prediction accuracies with original and sanitized dataset are both above 90%. There is a tradeoff between anonymity protection level and data utility. We can see that the prediction accuracy drops as the anonymity level of the published dataset is increased.
It is important to note that moderate degree of anonymization is helpful for improving model's robustness and better fitting unseen data. Particularly, KNN model constructed with 2-anonymized dataset achieves higher prediction accuracy than that built with original dataset. We also implement an occupancy prediction model based on Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the corresponding results are shown in Figure 4b where we can observe the similar patterns. This is because the training data points usually contain both the useful information that can be used to predict unseen cases, as well as the useless noise that can degrade the model. Essentially, k-anonymization reduces the "harmful" noise by aggregating similar data points and avoids overfitting. This suggests that for a data publication with moderate anonymity requirement the sanitized dataset is more advantageous than the original dataset since the sanitized one can achieve privacy protection as well as an improved model quality.
Statistics.
Often, the raw time series collected in buildings are processed into some key information that is directly useful for informing various control applications. For instance, the occupancy statistics, such as arrival times, are of particular interest to designing occupant-responsive HVAC control algorithms. In light of this, we want to test if the sanitized database can retain these useful statistics. Figure 5 compares the histograms of the useful occupancy statistics including arrival time, departure time, and total occupation time extracted from the original and sanitized database, respectively. We can see that 2-anonymized database preserves the distribution of the interested statistics, especially the modes of the distribution. In other words, we can still retrieve accurate information about typical behaviors of occupants from the sanitized database. However, it is worth noting that data sanitization reduces the variability of the dataset, which is getting more pronounced when the anonymity level is increased to 7 as shown in Figure 5b , 5d and 5f. For instance, the departures at noon cannot be detected with the anonymized dataset. This is a direct consequence of "hide in the crowd" philosophy of k-anonymity. Therefore, it will be easier to mine population properties than atypical patterns from the sanitized data.
Utility of PAD With Customized Distance Metric
In this part, we investigate scenarios where the purpose of the data is known at the time of publication and there exists a "best" distance metric for microaggregation that retains maximal amount of information pertaining to the data analyst's interest. For instance, if the data is used for studying occupancy patterns of a building during lunch times, then the best metric will be the Euclidean distance over the lunch time period. The data sequences with similar lunch patterns will be grouped together by the "best" metric, and the information loss on lunch patterns caused by the substitution step will thereby be minimized. Similar to the previous evaluation section, we utilize two evaluation scenarios, namely, segments and peak hour energy usage, to exemplify potential interest of data analysts.
Note that although there has been fruitful previous research on data publishing, different approaches may not be directly comparable because they may have different viewpoints on what is considered to be "private". This is because existing work on kanonymization of datasets always relies on a generic metric in the microaggregation step. Therefore, PAD with generic distance metric is used as the baseline approach for comparison here.
Segment.
We use the following example to demonstrate the role of distance metric learning in the workflow of PAD. Consider that the data analyst wants to study the occupancy patterns during lunch time, i.e., 11 : 00 − 14 : 00. The IC matrix A associated with the best metric that minimizes the information loss during lunch period is illustrated in Figure 6a , which is equivalent to cutting off the lunch period and applying the Euclidean distance. We call this best metric as ground truth metric. The distance metric learned by PAD is shown in Figure 6b , which visually exhibits the same pattern as the ground truth metric. The values on the diagonal pertaining to the lunch period dominate. Close scrutinization on the learned metric shows that it contains some small nonzero off-diagonal entries which intuitively correspond to the rotation and rescaling of the original occupancy times series. In order to understand the effect of these small nonzero entries, we cluster all the daily profiles in the database according to the lunch time patterns and apply the linear transformation implied by the learned metric to the occupancy series in each cluster. The results are shown in Figure 7a and 7b, respectively. We can see that the distance learning procedure finds a linear transformation under which the data points that are "similar" in the data analyst's view are close to each other in terms of Euclidean distance. Figure 8 compares sanitization procedures that use a generic metric, the learned metric, and the ground truth metric, respectively, in terms of the tradeoff between anonymity level and information loss. We want to emphasize that the information loss for specialpurpose publication measures the difference between the interested information in the original data record and that in the sanitized record. Here, the information loss refers to the Euclidean distance of the lunch periods between the record in the original database and its sanitized version in the published database. We can see that the information loss can be significantly reduced by learning a proper metric for microaggregation.
Figure 8:
The tradeoff between anonymity level and information loss for the specialized publication for lunch time. Figure 9 demonstrates that with more labeled data pairs PAD can achieve better data quality. The pre-sanitized database contains 16 different entries, and the maximum number of data pairs for labeling is 16 2 = 120. Although it requires extra labeling effort to reduce information loss, we want to point out that the data analyst can use computer program to achieve automatic labeling in the case where the desired metric is explicitly defined. For example, in this experiment we write a script to label the similarity of data points by first clustering the data points and assigning the similarity label to a data pair according to whether the pair of points reside in the same cluster. We can also observe from Figure 9 that more labeled data pairs can reduce the variance of published data quality as well. 
Peak hour energy usage.
We consider an energy data use case that mines occupants' peak-hour energy use patterns. More specifically, the data analyst is interested in acquiring accurate information on total energy consumption during the peak hours, i.e., 17 : 00 − 20 : 00. The ground truth metric associated with this example can be defined as d p (x, x ) = f (x) − f (x ) 2 where f calculates the sum of the coordinates during peak hours for x and x . Figure 10 shows the information loss of peak time usage in the published datasets using the generic metric, the learned metric and the ground truth metric, respectively, under different anonymity guarantees. Again, the information loss is measured by the difference between peak-hour total usage of the original record and that of the sanitized version in the published database. We can observe a similar tradeoff between privacy and data quality to what we have seen in the use case of lunch-time segment. The information loss can be reduced by replacing a generic metric with the learned metric.
Figure 10:
The tradeoff between anonymity and information loss for data publication specialized for peak hour energy usage. Figure 11 shows the distribution of peak-time energy usage in the original database and the databases sanitized via the generic and learned metric. We can see that the learned metric better retains the modes of the original distribution. For instance, the peak-hour energy usage below 5000 W is completely neglected by the sanitized database with generic metric while the learned metric successfully grasps this probability mass and better captures the variation embedded in the original dataset. 
Computational Overhead
We also study the computational overhead associated with PAD. We first look into the complexity of the microaggregation part. Let the size of database be n, the dimension of the row be m, and the anonymity level be k. The microaggregation complexity mainly comprises O(n 2 m) computations of distance values and the complexity of the clustering process which is shown to be n(1 − 1/k) in the best case and (n/k − 1)(n/2 + k − 2) in the worst case [6] . Figure 12 demonstrates the computation time of microaggregation as a function of n, m and k. We can see that the overhead is approximately quadratic in the database size and linear in the dimension of the row. In addition, changing the anonymity level requirement does not affect the computational time significantly. The complexity of the metric learning step depends on the actual algorithm used for optimization and the convergence criterion. Figure 13 illustrates the relationship between computational time of metric learning and database dimension. The splitting conic solver [25] is used for solving the learned distance metric. The number of labeled pairs dictates the amount of constraints in the metric optimization problem. Generally, the computational time associated with the metric learning part increases with the number of labeled data pairs and the dimension of the data records. 
FUTURE WORK
We have shown that using a sanitized database can often achieve similar performance to using original database, and selecting the proper metric will enhance the published data quality. However, the distance metric learning step currently implemented in PAD essentially finds a linear transformation on the original data. This poses some challenges in retaining information that is a nonlinear function of the original data series, such as arrival and departure times. One potential solution is to utilize neural networks [17] to learn better metrics in the case where the interested information is a nonlinear function of the original data record. However, this approach raises the challenge of the demand for a great number of labeled data pairs.
Current implementation of PAD implies the published dataset is optimized for a particular data purpose. If the data analyst has multiple purposes, it remains a question if there is a distance metric that better serves for multiple specific purposes than a simple generic metric. In addition, assuming several data analysts obtain databases sanitized according to their different purposes, it needs further study on the privacy implication when they collude with each other.
RELATED WORKS
In this section, we provide more details on the state-of-art of the private-preserving data publication systems which we have alluded to in the introduction.
RAPPOR [12] is a data collection and publication system that provides differential privacy guarantees. The basic idea of RAPPOR is the extension of the randomized response technique where the true data is randomly perturbed to a random value with some probability depending on the strength of privacy protection. RAPPOR is only applicable to one or two dimensional crowdsourced data for estimating data distribution. Plausible deniability [3] is a privacy notion that has recently been used for generating synthetic dataset for publication. It ensures at least k input records that could have generated the observed output with similar probability. Plausible deniability is closely related to differential privacy. The authors in [3] show that a differentially private mechanism can be obtained by slightly modifying a plausibly deniable mechanism. The difference between k-anonymity and plausible deniability is that the former is a syntactic condition on the published dataset, whereas the latter is a condition on the synthetic data generation algorithm.
Calmon et al. [9] pioneers research on applying information theory and statistical decision frameworks to study the privacy leakage from data publication. The framework models privacy using a probabilistic argument and data utility to be the distance between the true value and the perturbed value. Under this framework, the problem of solving the optimal perturbation can be converted to the rate-distortion problem which has been extensively studied in information theory. Rajagopalan el al. [27] applies the framework to smart meter data publication. The caveat of this framework is that it requires a model of joint distribution of private information and sensor measurements, which is however difficult to be obtained in practice.
K-anonymity has received a great deal of attention during the last decade, and has been successfully implemented in various areas among which the most prominent one is location-based services [14] . Gruteser et al. [15] presents a location data collection system that adjusts the resolution of location information along spatial or temporal dimensions to meet anonymity constraints. Location data takes the form of time series and often has strong time correlation, and exhibits similar features to the data collected in buildings. Our work is partially inspired by the wide adoption of k-anonymity in location-based services.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an open-sourced data publication system, PAD, for protecting k-anonymity of time series data collected in buildings. PAD guarantees the published data is free from linkage attack, i.e., the adversary cannot recover the entire time series record of an individual even if the attacker has the knowledge about snippets of the individual's data via external observations. This is the anonymity guarantee that cannot be achieved by simply removing the identifier of the data records, which is nevertheless the common practice today in building-related data publication. We show through extensive experiments on a real-world dataset that the k-anonymized data output by PAD still retains useful information for various data mining tasks. In order to further improve the quality of the data published, PAD implements a metric learning module that serves as a unified platform on which data analysts convey their diverse interests via a standardized protocol, i.e., the system provides a batch of data pairs and the analyst labels similarity accordingly. The learned metric can then be used to better preserve the information of interest to data analysts. We demonstrate that incorporating humans in the loop of data publication can achieve lower information loss on various building-related data mining examples. By proposing PAD we hope to revolutionize the way building related datasets are published.
